The Penetration of Twelver Shi’a Among the Zaidis of Yemen

The Twelver Shi’a project is based on an expansion policy via exporting the Shi’a Madhhab to all Sunni countries, beginning with total control and a revival of the Greater Persian Empire which they dream of. Yemen is of a central priority within this Twelver Shi’a neo-imperial project and the country is central to Rāfidee and Bātinee ambitions. Not to mention the fact that Yemen is also the only country which has maintained the Zaydī/Hādawī Madhhab, along with the rule of its Imams, for about ten centuries as opposed to all other countries today. Yet despite the clear differences between the Zaydī and Twelver Shi’a Madhhabs the latter have made repeated attempts, past and present, to penetrate the Zaydīs without paying any heed to differences. After the Khomeini-Rāfidī revolution at the end of the last [Islamic century] and the Iranian state’s emphasis on exporting the Twelver Shi’a project around the Islamic world and outside of it, so as to execute “Plan 50”, which involves disseminating Shi’ism around the world. Yemen was at the top of a set of countries which was focused on, and the first targets were the Zaydīs. A number of important factors assisted their penetration such as:

– The shared Shi’ism between the two madhhabs – even if the Zaydī Madhhab is the less excessive and the closest to the Madhhab of Ahl us-Sunnah.

– Exploiting the ignorance of the Zaydiyyah regarding the reality of the Twelver Shi’a Madhhab and decreasing the protective role of the Zaydī scholars.

– Exploiting the dire standard of living of Yemen generally and of the Zaydī areas specifically, which out of all the areas are the most deprived.

– Exploiting the need of most adherents of the Zaydī Madhhab to bring back the Zaydiyyah to authoritative power; especially from the Hāshimī family who are distinguished by religion and religiosity among the Zaydiyyah of Yemen. Indeed, the slogan of many of them is as follows: “Tell Fahd and the palaces of spinsters, that we are the masters; we will restore the rule of the Imām, either by the garment of the Prophet or by the garment of Marx; and if the Hijāz and Najd are lost, we have noble brothers in the Persians”.

The abovementioned project exploited all means in Yemen to win over Zaydī scholars and intellectuals due to their heedlessness and the heedlessness of the Yemeni state. Of the most successful means to influence the state of affairs in Yemen is by dispatching teachers from Iran, ’Iraq and Lebanon to influence others and spread the Twelver Shi’a ideology. This has a role in the formation of the Shabāb Party of Sa’dah and the Hūthī Movement. The Zaydī ’Ulama had a distinct stance against the Shabāb Party and the Hūthī Movement when they both started and at the beginning of the first war the Zaydī ’Ulama warned and cautioned against both groups and negated their ascription to the Zaydiyyah, highlighting their dangers to the Yemeni nation. However, this stance from the Zaydī ’Ulama did not last long and its voice was silence to the extent that they then began to defend and justify Hūthī crimes as seen within “al-Balāgh” newspaper. This change in position came after the Hūthīs imposed their control over the Sa’dah Province and became a tangible, real, sizeable and dangerous movement. The reader can compare between two statements issued by the Zaydī scholars:

One: a statement issued during the first war of 25 June 2004

Two: a statement issued during the Sixth War which ended in 2011 when the Hūthīs began to support the Yemeni state.

Within these two contradictory statements one can comprehend the clear difference in the changing faces and differing religious and political stances of these people. Three further examples can be given to illustrate this further:

One: the religious stance is exemplified and expressed by Dr. al-Mahtūrī, a staunch defender of the Hūthī Movement and ideology and its related political project. He uses positive words for them and justifies their actions; he is said to be an acknowledged Zaydī reference point. For him there is no oppression in this world except that it comes from other than “Ahl ul-Bayt”.

Two: the Zaydī political stance is expressed by: as-Sayyid Hasan Zayd al-Mutawakkil. He was a member of a panel to mediate and resolve the conflict with the Hūthīs on the part of the Yemeni government. Today their voices are taken into consideration as defenders of the Hūthī Movement for everything they do. According to him, if the Hūthīs are not symbols of justice in the world then there are no symbols of justice on the face of the earth!
Three: the ideological imposition of the Twelver Shi’a project is illustrated within al-Balāgh newspaper. It was once the voice-piece for the Zaydī Hizb ul-Haqq and later changed into a Hūthī newspaper. It became one of the most important platforms for the defence of the Rāfidah-Persian project in Yemen and in the name of the Zaydiyyah of Yemen, it published 19 demands which contained the call to expel the Salafīs from Sa’dah. The newspaper also had a role in publishing defamation of the Sahābah. In a series of articles (edition nos. 661-693 of the newspaper), it published slander and defamation of Abū Hurayrah and of the Two Saheehs. The Yemeni newspaper al-Ummah also published slanderous claims against the Two Saheehs (in edition nos. 358, 359, 369, 371 and 375). Al of this is done in the name of the Zaydiyyah of Yemen and behind it is the Twelver Shi’a creed, so all the historical differences the two Madhhabs had are being phased out. The insightful observer is able to see that the Zaydiyyah of Yemen or the Hūthī Movement are merely copies, or blind followers, of Hizbollah in Lebanon or at least on the way to becoming like them. They have also become a branch of the Shi’a seminaries of Qom, Najaf and the like. The famous saying is almost becoming a reality in relation to them: “Give me a small Zaydī and I will bring forth a major Rāfidee”

Proofs for what has been mentioned prior are the following:

One: ideological penetration, and this was evidenced by the Hūthī attempt to exercise many Rāfidī ritual practices such as:

1. Reviving the Āshūrā’ celebrations which are of the features Twelver Shi’ism and of all other Bātinī sects which involves expressing grief and sadness and self-harm and mutilation, alongside cursing the Sahābah, emotional agitation for Husayn, etc. These are all imported innovations into the Zaydī Madhhab and is not from their heritage, rather what is well-known from the Zaydī ’Ulama is that they prohibit such practices.

2. Reviving the Arba’īnāt [Shi’a 40th day celebrations and festivals regarding Husayn’s killing] – a distinct Twelver Shi’a practice which has no basis whatsoever in the Zaydī Madhhab. Today it has become widespread even in those areas which have no link to Shi’ism such as Jablah, Sabr and other Sunni areas. The purpose is apparently to agitate the feelings of the Yemeni people within Sunni areas.

3. Reviving what is known as the “’Eid al-Ghadeer” celebrations – a pure innovation of Twelver Shi’ism and was rejected by the Zaydī Imāms, however, it has now entered Zaydī practice even though it was not known until 1073 AH due to some extremist Jāroodees who had been affected by Rafd during that time.

4. Reviving the Mawlid an-Nabi [celebrating the Prophet’s birthday] – this has no basis with the Zaydiyyah and it also cannot be said that it is present in most of the Islamic world, Sunni and Shi’a, because history and testimony confirms that the celebrations were initiated by the Rāfidah to begin with. The first to institute celebrating the Mawlid were the Rāfidī ’Ubaydīs in Egypt [aka the Fatimids] and then others took it from them. However, the intent of this celebration differs between the Shi’a and the Sunnis who practice it from the Sūfīs and others. The Hūthīs have revived the practice of Mawlid in the manner of the Persian Twelver Shi’a. This is the difference between them and the rest of the Muslims and this was not known of from the Zaydiyyah except for recently.

5. Announcing their freedom from the Mushrikeen during Hajj – as they claim, and it is announced by the Iran Rāfidah who first began this rejected innovation. Prior to them it was a slogan and symbol of the Bātinī Qarāmitah such as Abū Sa’eed al-Janābī and his follows who killed the pilgrims during the days of Tashreeq in Makkah. It is not hidden that Husayn al-Hūthī, in adhering to this Shi’a bida’, calls his followers to do this practice and it is something also unheard of among the Zaydiyyah having no basis at all within their Madhhab.

6. Reviving their innovated slogans which they scream in mosques at the end of the congregational prayers, including Jumu’ah and on ’Eid. They make these slogans individual obligations for their followers to exclaim and not collective obligations, for they claim that it is of the least obligations of jihad and declaring freedom from the enemies of Allāh. The slogan is: “Allāhu Akbar, death to America, death to Israel, curses upon the Jews, victory is for Islām!” This is also sometimes added to their calls to prayer and it is in essence a political statement which has become a distinct practice of the Hūthīs, having no basis at all with the Zaydīs. It is a slogan which has no real and tangible basis and the reality is that the slogan is far from its assumed application as the Hūthīs fight against Muslim people, Muslim armed forces and Sunni tribes in Sa’dah, Hajjah, Jawf and other areas!

Two: Political Penetration

This is evident due to the following:

1. Following the same method for broadening the scope of expansion and control over a number of Yemeni Provinces after Sa’dah such as Jawf, Hajjah and ’Amran. Then to implement Iranian real-politik within Sunni areas and Iraqi provinces along with Hizbollah politics.

2. Using populist methods and deceptive slogans for show such as: the false enmity against America and Israel, as done by Injād and Hasan Nasrallah in Lebanon – which indicates that the politik is one.

3. Constant praising of the Iranian state and Hezbollah and intense amazement with their politics. This is evident with Husayn Badruddeen who has the same political stances as his masters within Iran and Hezbollah. For example, the Hūthīs current support of the Syrian State against the revolution and claiming that the revolution in Syria is an external conspiracy! This is all at a time when the Hūthīs claim that they are with the Yemeni Revolution against oppression and tyranny! This is a clear contradiction, not to mention that recently they have attempted to derail the revolution and overthrow the government of national reconciliation in Yemen!

4. Duplicating deceptive slogans and utisiling media misguidance – as practised by the Rāfidah of Iran, Lebanon and elsewhere. It was mentioned prior that the Hūthīs have come under creedal and political influence in the form of the slogans, and at the same time the leader of the Hūthī Movement has demonstrated his blind following of the persona of Hasan Nasrallah of Lebanon and replicating Nasrallah in everything, except for wearing a black turban on his head! For example, the use of green flags by the Hūthīs and sanctification of the leader.

Three: Economic and Social Penetration

Exemplified through the imposition of the Khums instead of Zakāt and of taxes and duties so as to fund the “Mujāhideen” and other forms of control of their followers. It may be that the involvement of their Rāfidah masters in the drug trade may be another source of financial aid to them.

As for the social aspect then this is apparent within the statements of praise and honour which are lavished upon their leaders and designating them as reference points and attempting to entrench this within the society.
What can also be added to the previously mentioned evidences is the influx of Shi’a trainers, doctors and teachers from Iran, Iraq and Lebanon and the financial support given to the Hūthīs. Also the presence of Iranian weapons which are smuggled past ships and naval patrol boats. Furthermore, there have been religious calls from Iran to staunchly support the Hūthīs in their wars under the cover of the two Shi’a Satellite channels al-’Ālam and al-Manār. All of this, and other prominent evidences, indicates the Twelver Rāfidī penetration of the Hūthīs and the Zaydīs of Yemen. So when all of this is found, along with the acceptance, susceptibility and identification of the Zaydīs [with the Twelver Madhhab], the Rāfidah of Iran are also able to prepare all manner of weapons for the Zaydiyyah and overlook all differences and distinctions that are found between the two Madhhabs. This indicates that the Zaydī Madhhab has been nominated by Iran as a candidate for imminent fall and that it is facing a dangerous transformation from a moderate Zaydī Madhhab towards the Ja’farī Twelver extremist one.

We ask Allāh for a good end and for all of the Muslims and our final supplication is that all praise is due to Allāh, the Lord of the Worlds and may peace and blessings be upon our Prophet Muhammad, his family and all of his companions.